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BOX 3.1AMCESFI: THE NEW MACROPRUDENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The financial crisis revealed that the microprudential (case-by-
case) regulatory and supervisory approach alone was not sufficient 
to identify and, in the last instance, prevent or mitigate the impact 
of the materialisation of systemic risk on financial stability. 
It became clear, therefore, at both the international and the 
European level, that each jurisdiction should have an institutional 
and normative framework for macroprudential policy to safeguard, 
in a coordinated and effective manner, not only the stability of the 
financial system as a whole but also that of each of its component 
sectors (among which, the banking sector). 
Competence in individual countries in the fields of financial stability, 
regulation and prudential supervision is often distributed between 
several authorities, each of which is responsible for a part or sector 
of the financial system. In Spain, macroprudential responsibility 
for the credit institution sector lies with the Banco de España,1 
while the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) is 
responsible for investment firms and the Directorate General of 
Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSyFP), which is part of the 
Ministry of the Economy and Enterprise, for bodies within its 
supervisory remit. 
As a result of the significant growth in interconnections between 
financial institutions and markets, and their increasing complexity, 
institutional cooperation mechanisms that facilitate the exchange 
of information and analysis are essential, allowing macroprudential 
policy measures to be used to comprehensively address possible 
sources of systemic risk. Financial globalisation has also meant 
that the supranational dimension of financial stability is becoming 
increasingly important. 
In consequence, at the end of 2010, the European System Risk 
Board (ESRB)2 was created as part of the European System of 
Financial Supervision. The ESRB’s mission is to “contribute to the 
prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability”, 
to ensure “a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to 
economic growth”. The central banks and financial supervision 
authorities of all the EU countries are members of the ESRB (in the 
case of Spain, the Banco de España, CNMV and DGSyFP).
In one of its first measures, in 2011 the ESRB issued a 
Recommendation3 urging all EU Member States to designate an 
authority responsible for macroprudential policy, with functions to 
identify, oversee and assess risks to financial stability and with 
the power to foment measures to address these risks. In the same 
vein, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), through its Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), has actively expressed 
its backing for the creation of macroprudential authorities for 
the whole of the financial system.4 
Against this backdrop, in recent years many European countries 
have established a national macroprudential authority.5 In some 
cases, a broad mandate and new instruments have been given to 
an existing authority (notably the national central bank, as in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland). Various other countries have 
chosen to create a collegiate authority (a “systemic risk committee”), 
which under various forms of governance includes the central 
bank, banking, securities and insurance regulators and supervisors, 
and the ministry with competence for financial system legislation 
(as in Germany and France). The apparent need to strengthen 
macroprudential policies warrants the inclusion of government 
ministries in these authorities, as it has been found that a 
significant number of countries have taken into account political 
economy considerations when designing their financial stability 
governance structures.6 Accordingly, the ultimate configuration 
of a macroprudential authority responds to individual countries’ 
idiosyncratic specificities.7 
In the case of Spain, the process of creation of a macroprudential 
authority was influenced by the existence, since 2006, of the 
Financial Stability Committee (CESFI).8 The CESFI was created by 
means of a voluntary cooperation agreement between the Ministry 
of Economy, the Banco de España and the CNMV, to address 
matters of common interest in the field of financial stability 
and crisis prevention and management. But the CESFI lacked the 
legal status to grant it a formal mandate or properly defined 
functions or tasks. 
In view of the international backdrop, at the end of 2018 the CESFI 
served as a discussion platform for the project to create 
the national macroprudential authority, as per the ESRB 
Recommendation, and for a draft legislative proposal to endow 
the sectoral supervisory authorities with macroprudential 
instruments in addition to those provided for in European legislation. 
1  In addition, the European Central Bank also has competences in matters 
of macroprudential policy over all the euro area countries’ credit 
institutions, by virtue of the tasks conferred on it when the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism was established in 2014.
2  Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union 
macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board.
3  ESRB Recommendation of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential 
mandate of national authorities (ESRB/2011/3).
4  See, for the case of Spain, the IMF document “Spain: Financial Sector 
Assessment Program-Technical Note-Systemic Risk Oversight 
Framework and Macroprudential Policy” of 13 November 2017.
5  See the ESRB document “List of national macroprudential authorities 
and national designated authorities in EU Member States”. Italy is 
currently the only EU Member State that has not yet created a national 
macroprudential authority.
6  “New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks” by 
R.M. Edge and J.N. Liang, Hutchins Center Working Paper #50 
(February 2019).
7  For a summary of the institutional reforms worldwide, see “Financial 
supervisory architecture: what has changed after the crisis?” by D. Calvo, 
J.C. Crisanto, S. Hohl and O. Pascual Gutiérrez, Financial Stability 
Institute, FSI Insights on policy implementation No 8 (April 2018).
8  See D. Vegara’s article “Funciones y objetivos del Comité de Estabilidad 
Financiera (CESFI)”, Financial Stability Review No 11, Banco de España, 
November 2006.
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Following a public hearing at the end of 2018, in early March 2019 
the Spanish Council of Ministers approved Royal Decree 102/2019 
creating the new macroprudential authority (AMCESFI).9 It is 
organised as a collegiate body attached to the Ministry of 
the Economy and Enterprise and is made up of representatives 
from the Ministry, the Banco de España, the CNMV and the 
DGSyFP (see Diagram A). 
The purpose of the AMCESFI is to “contribute to the stability of the 
financial system overall, by identifying, preventing and mitigating 
circumstances or actions that may produce systemic risk”. To that 
end, it will regularly monitor and analyse systemic risk factors. 
Its powers will include issuing warnings and recommendations on 
any matter that may affect financial stability, and also opinions 
on proposed macroprudential measures notified in advance to 
the AMCESFI by the sectoral supervisory authorities (the Banco 
de España, CNMV and DGSyFP).
The AMCESFI Board has seven members, four of whom represent 
the independent supervisory bodies. The Board Chair is the 
Minister for the Economy and Enterprise and the Vice-Chair 
the Governor of the Banco de España. Below the Board there is a 
Financial Stability Technical Committee with nine members, 
six of whom are from the independent supervisory bodies. 
The Committee Chair is the Deputy Governor of the Banco de 
España and the Vice-Chair the General Secretary for the Treasury 
and International Financing. The Committee is tasked with 
preparing the matters to be submitted to the Board, with 
the Banco de España acting as secretary. 
For purposes of transparency and accountability, the AMCESFI 
should publish the opinions, warnings and recommendations it 
issues (unless their dissemination is inadvisable as it poses 
a potential threat to financial stability) and should present an 
annual report to the Economy and Enterprise Parliamentary 
Committee of the Congress of Deputies. 
In parallel, the Spanish government approved Royal Decree Law 
22/2018 on macroprudential tools,10 which extended the range 
of instruments available to the sectoral authorities to be applied 
to institutions within their regulatory remit. In particular, the 
Banco de España was authorised to establish for reasons of 
systemic risk: (i) a countercyclical capital buffer applicable to 
sector-specific exposures; (ii) limits on credit institutions’ 
concentration on a certain economic sector; and (iii) conditions 
on lending and other operations by credit institutions. These last 
macroprudential tools based on borrowers’ ability to pay 
(borrower-based instruments) have been introduced in other 
European countries’ national legislation and are being actively 
employed to prevent cyclical easing of credit standards by 
banks, aiming to actively manage the credit risk incurred in 
their business.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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9   Royal Decree 102/2019 of 1 March 2019 creating the AMCESFI, 
establishing its legal regime and implementing certain aspects on 
macroprudential tools.
10  Royal Decree Law 22/2018 of 14 December 2018 establishing 
macroprudential tools, which was validated by the Congress of 
Deputies on 22 January 2019.
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In the case of the banking sector, these instruments are in addition 
to those already available since 2016 through the European 
Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR/CRD IV), 
implementing in the European Union the macroprudential 
instruments included in the Basel III global regulatory framework: 
(i) the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB); and (ii) capital 
buffers set for global and other systemically important institutions, 
as well as (iii) the systemic risk buffer (although this instrument is 
not included in the Basel III framework). In addition, the Banco de 
España has been designated the competent authority to apply 
Article 458 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 26 June 
2013,definitively enshrining competence that to date was 
only temporary. 
Similarly, both the CNMV and the DGSyFP may set limits and 
conditions on the activities of institutions within their supervisory 
remit, which will facilitate coordinated action. Moreover, the CNMV 
has been strengthened, being granted the power to temporarily 
increase the percentage investment in liquid assets required of 
investment fund and venture capital management companies. In 
turn, the DGSyFP will be able to set conditions on operations 
involving transfer of risks and insurance portfolios. These 
instruments, which in some cases represent an international 
innovation, will foreseeably be added to in coming years, in 
keeping with global advances in macroprudential policies 
beyond banking.
With the creation of the AMCESFI and implementation of a raft of 
macroprudential instruments in addition to those already available 
under European legislation, Spain has secured an institutional 
and regulatory framework comparable to that of other EU Member 
States and is now, therefore, better placed to address potential 
future systemic financial crises in a more effective and more 
coordinated manner.
